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After the appearance of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in April 
2009, inﬂ  uenza activity was monitored within the Kaiser Per-
manente Northern California division by using laboratory, 
pharmacy, telephone calls, and utilization (services patients 
received) data.  A combination of testing and utilization data 
showed a pattern of disease activity, but this pattern may 
have been affected by public perception of the epidemic. 
I
n April 2009, the novel swine-origin H1N1 inﬂ  uenza 
virus, now referred to as pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, 
was identiﬁ  ed in the United States in California and in 
Mexico. During April, increasing numbers of cases were 
identiﬁ  ed in Mexico, and sporadic cases were seen in the 
United States, mostly in returning travelers (1). Media 
coverage was high, and the public and medical communi-
ties were alert to the presence of the novel virus (2). Al-
though the World Health Organization raised its inﬂ  uenza 
alert level to phase 6 (calling this a true pandemic) on 
June 11, by this time media attention in the United States 
had waned, and concern was for reemergence in the fall 
(3). However, virus activity did not diminish in northern 
California; rather, pandemic (H1N1) 2009 inﬂ  uenza re-
mained active at high levels.
Kaiser Permanente (KP) is a medical care organiza-
tion with 3.2 million members in its Northern California 
division (KPNC). Members receive essentially all medical 
care from KP providers and in KP facilities. An electronic 
medical record system records diagnoses from outpatient 
and emergency department visits and hospitalizations, as 
well as medications, immunizations, and ancillary services 
received by patients. A central laboratory in Berkeley per-
forms all microbiologic and virologic testing. In addition, 
all telephone callers to the system are routed to central call 
centers, where information is gathered on whether the call-
er is asking inﬂ  uenza-related questions. This report details 
the recent experience of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in KPNC 
and documents KP surveillance efforts. 
The Study
Inﬂ  uenza testing was performed by using a real-time 
PCR for inﬂ  uenza A and B and respiratory syncytial virus on 
nasopharyngeal swabs. Similar methods have been shown 
to be superior to other tests and sensitive and speciﬁ  c for 
detecting pandemic (H1N1) 2009 inﬂ  uenza (4). A weekly 
report went to primary care providers, advising on current 
viral activity, and gave guidelines for testing and treating. 
All specimens positive for inﬂ  uenza A were transported to 
the California State Department of Public Health labora-
tory for H1N1 conﬁ  rmation testing early in the pandemic, 
but testing was later restricted to specimens from hospital-
ized patients only. Results of testing were provided weekly 
with counts from the previous week, Sunday through Sat-
urday. Hospitalization rates were counted weekly by us-
ing text strings from admission diagnoses for pneumonia 
or inﬂ  uenza. If KPNC members had questions regarding 
inﬂ  uenza, when they called for advice or appointments they 
were triaged to the “ﬂ  u queue,” where they could receive 
prerecorded messages or one-on-one advice with a nurse or 
physician. We plotted the percentage of all calls per week 
that were counted as inﬂ  uenza related. Weekly counts of 
medical ofﬁ  ce visits for inﬂ  uenza-like illness (ILI)—fever, 
inﬂ  uenza, or upper respiratory infection—were also plot-
ted. The study was reviewed and approved by the Kaiser 
Permanente and Institutional Review Boards.
The Figure, panel A, shows that the total number of 
respiratory tests rose drastically during late April, when 
media coverage was high. This increase was accompanied 
by an increase in the total number of respiratory specimens 
positive for inﬂ  uenza A. During this initial phase, utiliza-
tion of resources was high, but there appeared to be little 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in the community because the per-
centage of positive specimens ranged from 5% to 7%. The 
Figure, panel B, shows outpatient visits for ILI per 1,000 
members and percentages of total hospitalizations for pneu-
monia or inﬂ  uenza during 2009, along with the percentage 
of respiratory specimens positive for inﬂ  uenza A. The ﬁ  rst 
increase correlates with 2008–09 seasonal inﬂ  uenza, which 
peaked in February. Then in late April, at the same time 
as the increase in volume of inﬂ  uenza testing, there was an 
increase in outpatient visits for ILI and hospitalizations for 
pneumonia or inﬂ  uenza. In the Figure, panel C, the percent-
age of inﬂ  uenza-related telephone calls is plotted alongside 
the percentage of respiratory specimens that were positive 
for inﬂ  uenza A. Similarly to trends in medical appointments 
and hospitalizations, calls showed a marked increase during 
the pandemic scare period, then decreased and rose again 
more gradually with the ﬁ  rst wave of the pandemic, along 
with the percentage of specimens positive for inﬂ  uenza A.
Media coverage rapidly subsided, and reports from the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention showed that the 
number of cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was diminish-
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ing in Mexico and the United States (1). Testing and treating 
diminished and utilization of healthcare services returned 
to normal. However, pandemic (H1N1) 2009 continued 
to circulate widely, even after schools closed for summer 
vacation. By mid-May, the percentage of specimens posi-
tive for inﬂ  uenza A was 10% and then rapidly increased 
to 49% only 4 weeks later. State subtyping of hospitalized 
patients (inside and outside the KP) who were positive for 
inﬂ  uenza A showed that >95% of specimens tested from 
those patients were either not subtypeable or were positive 
for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 inﬂ  uenza virus (J. Louie, Cali-
fornia Department of Public Health, pers. comm.). Hospi-
talizations for pneumonia and inﬂ  uenza, outpatient visits 
for ILI, and inﬂ  uenza-related phone calls all rose in concert 
with the percentage of positive specimens.
Conclusions
During the recent outbreak of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
inﬂ  uenza in California, KPNC providers had access to qual-
ity, real-time information on the ongoing outbreak. This 
accessibility proved useful for guiding testing and treating 
algorithms and provided information during a time of great 
uncertainty and public fear.
Although the data were useful, it appears that during a 
time of intense media attention healthcare utilization may 
be susceptible to public perception and media coverage. 
During the pandemic scare period, although it appeared 
that inﬂ  uenza was circulating widely, test results and uti-
lization data indicate that most activity was not related to 
either pandemic or seasonal inﬂ  uenza but that it may have 
been generated by demand created by false perceptions. It 
is interesting that even hospitalizations increased during 
this time because we generally perceive increased hospital-
izations to be a marker of virulence and true activity. Dur-
ing the later phase of the pandemic, hospital and outpatient 
utilization rose in concert with the percentage of positive 
test results, reﬂ  ecting virus activity. During this time, me-
dia coverage was relatively low, and this was reﬂ  ected by 
lower numbers of telephone calls to the system.
The percentage of positive specimens appeared to be 
the best indicator of inﬂ  uenza activity because it was sen-
sitive to rapid changes, but was a more speciﬁ  c indicator 
than specimens sent, number positive, outpatient or inpa-
tient utilization, or telephone call-ins. The total number of 
patients tested is also informative because it can help deﬁ  ne 
the relationship of testing to public perceptions. However, 
extremely high numbers can obscure a higher percent posi-
tive if persons seek medical care more from panic than for 
actual symptoms. The ﬁ  rst-wave pandemic peak of positive 
samples was high compared with those from the seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza outbreak in February (49% vs. 22%); total num-
bers were lower. This difference may reﬂ  ect patterns of 
testing by providers and reasons for patients to go to medi-
cal centers, but the high percentage of positive samples 
may reﬂ  ect large numbers of cases in the community and 
the wide distribution of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 inﬂ  uenza. 
The weekly report inﬂ   uenced provider testing with 
guidelines that changed as the season progressed. When 
the percentage positive was high at all facilities and the 
laboratory was overwhelmed with requests, providers were 
advised to decrease testing unless needed for a clinical 
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Figure. A) Inﬂ   uenza A testing in Kaiser Permanente Northern 
California division (KPNC), 2009. Shown are total numbers of 
specimens sent, number of specimens positive for inﬂ  uenza A, and 
percentage of specimens positive for inﬂ   uenza A. B) Outpatient 
visits for inﬂ  uenza-like illness (fever, inﬂ  uenza, or upper respiratory 
infection) per 1,000 members, percentage of all hospitalizations 
with a diagnosis of pneumonia or inﬂ  uenza (P&I), and percentage 
of specimens positive for inﬂ  uenza A, KPNC, 2009. C) Inﬂ  uenza-
related telephone calls to KPNC, 2009, and percentage of 
specimens positive for inﬂ  uenza A.workup or for any hospitalization. This request may have 
produced artifacts in the testing in that total numbers and 
the percentage positive may have varied based on the sen-
sitivity and speciﬁ  city of provider testing. 
Surveillance for inﬂ  uenza, both seasonal and pandem-
ic, by using electronic data is informative for medical orga-
nizations with a systematic approach to testing for inﬂ  uenza 
virus. Monitoring of medical utilization may be helpful in 
a pandemic, but ﬂ  uctuations are susceptible to public im-
pression and media coverage. An integrated approach to 
inﬂ  uenza surveillance, combining laboratory testing and 
utilization, would be optimal.  
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